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Abstract 
We examine the roles of slotting and renewal allowances in the allocation 
of scarce retail shelf space. Several contrasting features of the two shelf 
allocational mechanisms are shown. 
With slotting allowances, manufacturers can signal the profitability of new 
products and retailers can screen out the least profitable products. With re- 
newal allowances in a full information context, manufacturers can induce 
retailers to carry their less profitable products, illustrating a "push" ap- 
proach to attaining shelf placement: manufacturers of product that enjoy 
strong consumer "pull* obtain shelf placement without paying renewal 
allowances. In both cases, product proliferation results in higher slotting and 
renewal allowances by raising the opportunity cost of shelf space. However, 
as countervailing leverage against retailers, manufacturers of successful 
product lines can use their successful products to help attain placement for 
their relatively weak products. 
SEOUL JOURNAL OF BUSINESS 
I . Introduction 
Retailers often function as "gatekeepers" when allocating scarce shelf 
space among competing manufacturers' products. In this paper, we analyze 
strategic interactions among manufacturers and retailers that occur in this 
process. We examine two models of shelf space allocation based on slotting 
allowances and renewal allowances. Slotting allowances are one-time 
payments by manufacturers to retailers in exchange for "slots" for their new 
products. Renewal allowances are similar payments for continued shelf 
placement of existing products. 
Due to accelerating competition for shelf space, this analysis is particularly 
relevant today. Between 1980 and 1990, annual new grocery product 
introductions grew from 2,689 to 13,244(New Product News, selected issues), 
more than a fourfold increase, while the average number of items carried by 
grocery stores increased from 14,145 to 30,000(The Food Marketing Industry 
Speaks, Food Marketing Institute 1990, pp.233-234), which is roughly double. 
The number of grocery products grew still further to 167,980 by 1992. 
Coincident with this burst of new product introductions, trade promotions 
grew as a percentage of the total marketing budget from 34% in 1980 to 44% 
in 1990(Donnelley Marketing Annual Surveys of Promotional Practices, 
1980-1990). Slotting allowances and renewal allwances also emerged as stan- 
dard trade practices in the 1980s(Cannon and Bloom 1991, Toto 1990, 
Sullivan 1993, Gibson 1988, Blattberg and Neslin 1990). Curtis -Burns, for 
example, paid retailers $1 million to introduce its new canned-pie filling to 
half the country (Cannon and Bloom 1991), and Old Capitol paid Shoprite 
Foods $86,000 to stock $172,000 worth of microwave popcorn(Gibson 1988). 
By 1987, slotting and renewal allowances accounted for 30% to 55% of the 
estimated $17 billion manufactures spent on promotional expenditures2' In 
1) According to Cannon and Bloom(1991), although the practice of offering special deals(e.g., off-in- 
voice discounts, billback, and free cases to convince retailers to carry new products is not new, 
slotting allowances differ from more traditional trade promotions in three ways: (1) they are 
usually negotiated, (2) payment is made 'up-front" in the form of a lump sum, and (3) the magni- 
tude of individual payments is large. 
2 ) Sullivan 1993 :Advertising Age 8 / 3 / 87 and 5 / 9 / 88. Slotting allowances are generally believed to 
account for the bulk of this expenditure(Cannon and Bloom 1991). 
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roughly the same time period, a shift in the relative "power" of manu- 
facturers and retailers has been perceived to have oc~urred.~'  In this overall 
context, we are interested in examining whether these developments can be 
explained, in part, by the increasing competition for retail shelf space. 
In both of our models, many manfacturers compete for the shelf space of a 
single retailer. The first model, concerning the determination of slotting 
allowances, assumes an environment in which retailers are ill-informed 
about the profitability of various available new products (manufacturers are 
assumed to know the profitability of their own products). Three cases, based 
on different informational assumptions and institutional arrangements, are 
considered : an open English (ascending -bid) auction, a sealed bid auction, 
and the retailer's issuance of a take-it-or-leave-it offer. In all cases, slotting 
allowances serve as a mechanism to screen for the most profitable products. 
This is because only manufacturers who are confident of generating enough 
subsequent profits to recover the up-front cost of slotting allowances will pay 
them. The manufacturers, by paying slotting allowances, are thus signalling 
that their products are profitable. We go on to show that product prolifer- 
ation leads to growth in the level of slotting allowances. This is because 
product proliferation increases the demand for retail shelf space, which in 
turn pushes up the "price" of the slot. 
The second model, which describes the determination of renewal 
allowances, assumes an environment of perfect information. As with the first 
model, the most profitable products end up being carried and product pro- 
liferation leads to higher renewal allowances and a transfer of profit from 
manufacturer to retailer. This model also illustrates the role of "push" and 
"pull" approaches to achieving shelf placement. Manufacturers of less profit- 
able products must use a push approach to gain shelf placement by paying 
high renewal allowances. Manufacturers that enjoy strong consumer pull for 
their products gain shelf placement without the need to offer renewal 
allowances. Lastly, manufacturers of profitable lines of existing products are 
shown to be more able than single-product manufacturers to place less 
3) In a recent survey of manufacturing executives in the packaged goods industry, 74% responded 
that "power" has shifted towards retailers(Progressive Gvocey, April 1992, 24-26) 
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profitable products. Shelf placement is thus seen to be a greater barrier to 
entry for single-product manufacturers. 
Relevant Literature 
Slotting and renewal allowances are much discussed in the trade press(e. 
g., Felgner 1989, Therrien 1989, Davis 1989) and have merited some empiri- 
cal analyses(Sul1ivan 1993, Toto 1989) and examination of related legal 
issues(Cannon and Bloom 1991, Kelly 1991, Partch 1992). But few formal 
models of slotting or renewal allowances, or more generally of the shelf allo- 
cation mechanism, have been proposed, exceptions being those of Chu(1992) 
and S haffer ( 1991 ) . 
Our model of slotting allowances extends Chu's single-manufacturer / sin- 
gle-retailer analysis to the case of multiple manufacturers competing for the 
shelf space of a single retailer. We also examine a model of renewal 
allowances as a mechanism for shelf placement under perfect information. In 
the process, we suggest that different manufacturers offer the retailer differ - 
ential renewal allowances, which illustrates push versus pull approaches to 
achieving shelf placement. 
Our model of slotting allowances is more applicable to the US packaged 
goods industry than Schaffer's because it acknowledges the informational 
role of slotting allowances in screening out unprofitable products. Shaffer's 
model, by assuming that manufacturers are homogeneous and that retailers 
possess perfect information about product profitablity, ascribes to slotting 
allowances no informational role. 
Finally, our model of renewal allowances suggests that manufacturers with 
product lines are better able than single-product manufacturers to achieve 
retail shelf placement of less profitable items. Neither Chu nor Shaffer 
considers this issue. 
In the next section, we discuss the role of slotting allowances in allocating 
shelf space, and the relationship between product proliferation and slotting 
allowances. In Section 3, we discuss similar issues with regard to renewal 
allowances. We then conclude and suggest areas of further research in Sec- 
tion 4. 
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11. Product Proliferation and Slotting Allowances 
Notation and Model Struchrre 
We consider N manufacturers, each with a new product, who compete for 
the shelf space of a single retailer. The retailer has space for F(strict1y less 
than N)  products. (The amount ot shelf space allocated to a single product is 
henceforth called facing 1. 
We consider various mechanisms of allocating retail facings in which each 
manufacturer i that is carried by the retailer pays a slotting allowance si. 
After facings are allocated, each manufacturer whose product is carried sets 
its wholesale price and the retailer sets an associated retail price. 
To keep our model general, we do not explicitly analyze this price-setting 
part of the game. Instead, we allow the resulting manufacturer and retailer 
profits, denoted ni and n, respectively, to take on various values, which in- 
corporate most commonly considered forms of pricing as special cases, in- 
cluding (1) simultaneous determination of wholesale and retail prices, (2) 
leader-follower behavior, (3) Nash bargaining outcomes and (4) simple 
cost -plus pricing. 
The only restriction we require for tractability is that the product which 
generates the ith most manufacturer profit also generates the ith most retail 
profits stated formally : 
n,>n2>-->nN a d n1>n2>"'>nN. 
Thus, product i is unambiguously the ith most profitable product. 
We simplify our analysis by assuming that if the retailer carries i, then ni and 
ni are unchanged regardless of which other products are carried Namely, 
products are neither substitutes nor complements. We also assume that the 
maximum slotting allowance that manufacturer i can pay is ni (so that si€ [0, 
nil). To further simplify the analysis, we assume that money is indivisible be- 
yond E, where E is small. Our notation is summarized in Table 1. 
We assume that manufacturers know the profitability of their own 
products( through market research, pre -tests, and test markets) but the re - 
tailer does not(because the products are new). 
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Table 1 MODEL NOTATION 




We consider three different game formulations(i.e., open English auction, 
sealed -bid auction, and retailer take -it -or -leave-it offer ), which give rise to 
nearly the same equilibrium. The outcome is thus shown to be robust to dif- 
ferent informational and institutional assumptions-covering what we believe 
to be prototypical cases. In particular, similar equilibria arise regardless of 
whether the manufacturers and retailer are informed of the profitability of 
the products competing for shelf space and of who makes the initial slotting 
allowance offer. 
Open English Audion Representation. The slotting allowance is raised in 
increments and manufacturers indicate to the retailer whether 'they would 
be willing to pay. The process continues until only F manufacturers remain, 
each of whom pays the prevailing slotting allowance. (This form of English or 
ascending-bid auction is specifically called an English clock auction.) In this 
auction, the bidding process reveals information to the retailer about the 
profitability of manufacturers' products. The retailer need not know the 
manufacturers' profits for the market to attain equilibrium, nor do 
manufacturers need to know each others' profits. 
Sealed-bid Auction Representation. Each manufacturer i offers, simul- 
taneously and in secret, a slotting allowance si. The retailer then decides 
which offers to accept. Manufacturers are assumed to know the distribution 
of product profitability(n, and ni for i=l,  -,N) although not which 
manufacturers make which profits; they base their offers on this prior infor- 
mation. The retailer has the same prior information. 
The interesting feature of slotting allowance offers in this context is that 
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products. Although the retailer observes the slotting allowance offers with 
certainty, it does not know the associated profits form carrying the product: 
and the retailer is concerned with both. (Note that the retailer is not com- 
mitted to accepting the top F slotting allowance offers. ) 
We denote the retailer's prior expected retail profit from sale of product i, 
before observing a slotting allowance offer, as pi, and the retailer's posterior 
expected retail profit form sale of product, i, after updating expectations 
based on the slotting allowance offers, as bi. Such posterior expectations are 
specified as part of the equilibruim belief structure. The relevant equilib- 
rium concept is perfect Bayesian equilibrium. (See Appendix 1 for details. ) 
Retailer take-it-or-leave-it Represention. The retailer issues a single slotting 
allowance offer which each manufacturer can accept or reject. The .retailer 
is assumed to know the distribution of profits ni and xi, i=l,--,N, although 
not which manufacturer make which profits. Such information is required to 
avoid the retailer setting slotting allowances which result in empty shelves. 
(If the retailer lacked such information, it would be better off using an open 
English auction.) We assume that the retailer will not intentionally choose a 
slotting allowance that would leave empty shelves." We include this 
allocational mechanism as an alternative to the two auction representations 
and to facilitate a comparison of our model with that of Chu(1992). 
Equilibrium 
All three game formulations described above lead to essentially the same 
o~tcome.~ '  
Proposition 1. The top F products attain shelf placement in equilibrium. 
Manufacturers of these products pay slotting allowances of nF+,+& in the 
open English and sealed-bid aucitons, and nF in the retailer 
take-it -or-leave-it game. 
4) Appendix 2 shows that, under plausible assumptions about the distribution of profits, it is 
suboptimal for the retailer to intentionally leave open shelf space, even if it is allowed. 
5) See Appendix 2 for proofs of this and all subsequent results. 
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The intuitive rationale for this result is that the N-F least profitable 
products are kept off the shelves because the equilibrium slotting allowance 
level exceeds what the manufacturers of these less profitable products could 
afford to pay. In the open English auction, the bidding mechanism reveals 
the slotting allowance that can play this role. In the sealed-bid auction, the 
top F manufacturers offer a slotting allowance level that can signal that 
their products are, indeed, the most profitable. In the retailer 
take-it-or-leave-it case, the retailer sets a slotting allowance that screens 
out the unprofitable manufacturers. In all cases, the profitabiity of the 
F+lst manufacturer, nF+ ,, constitutes the "opportunity cost" of a shelf 
facing (i.e., the value of the next best opportunity). 
This opportunity cost determines the equilibrium slotting allowance, as 
illustrated in Figure 1 for the open English, and sealed-bid auctions. In the 
open English auction, equilibrium slotting allowances are E above this oppor- 
tunity cost because this is the smallest amount which eliminates the F+lst 
and all less profitable manufacturers from the bidding. In the sealed-bid 
auction, a bid of E above nF+, is also the smallest amount which 
unambiguously signals to the retailer that the bid is from one of the top F 
manufacturers(and that the attendant retail profit form carrying the product 
Figure 1 
EQUILIBRIUM OF SLOmNG ALLOWANCE MODEL 
Opportunity Cost 
I of Shelf Facing 
Slotting 'Allowances 
Hi = Manufacturer Profit for Product i 
Si = Slotting Allowance for Product i 
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is also one of the F highest). In the retailer take-it-or-leave-it case, the 
equilibrium slotting allowance level equals the profit of the product next in 
profitability above the F t l s t  products, n, 
The implications of Proposition 1 are as follow. First, slotting allowances serve 
as an optimal screening mechanism for the channel as a whole since the set of 
products that are ultimately carried maximizes total channel profit. In particu - 
lar, only the F most profitable manufacturers are willing to pay slotting 
allowances of nFt ,+&(or nF) because they are the only manufacturers confi- 
dent that subsequent sales and profits will recover this up-front fmed fee. 
This outcome substantiates the claim of some retailers that slotting 
allowances play a desirable economic role?' 
Second, slotting allowances serve as somewhat imperfect signals of 
expected levels of retail profit. The signals are imperfect because the 
manufacturers of the F most profitable products, which are all placed, have 
no incentive to distinguish themselves from one another. Hence, all pay the 
minimum slotting allowance that sets them apart form the N-F  least profit- 
able products. 
Third, the equilibrium result is robust in that it arises from both the open 
English and sealed-bid auctions, which have very different informational 
requirements and bidding structures. The open English auction does not re- 
quire manufactures to have information on the distribution of manufacturer's 
profits whereas the sealed-bid auction does. The open English auction also 
involves successive bidding stages(which appers more realistic), whereas the 
sealed-bid auction involves only one bidding stage(which does have the de- 
sirable property of attaining equilibrium q~ickly) .~ '  
Another important implication of Proposition 1 is highlighted in our next 
result. 
Proposition 2. Product proliferation (including at  least one product with 
profit higher than n,,) leads to an increase in slotting allowances. 
6 )  Viewed from another perspective, the retailer gets the best of both worlds. For each product i that 
it carries, it gets a greater slotting allowance and a greater retailer profit ni than would be obtain- 
able from carrying any of the other products. 
7) For flirther background in auction theory see Vickrey (19611, Riley(1989), and McAfee and 
McMiLlan ( 1987 ). 
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This arises as follows. If additional products become available with profit 
higher than the previous F-l-1st product, then there will be a new F+lst 
product such that n,": >n, ,. Therefore, the equilibrium slotting allowance 
level will increase to be E above this new opportunity cost of shelf space. 
This result differs from that of Chu(1992). In particular, our model, with 
the retailer take-it-or-leave-.it allocation mechanism, is most directly com- 
parable to Chu's model. Both models assume one retailer that makes a 
take-it -or-leave -it offer, informed about the distribution of manufacturers' 
product profitability. Both models conclude that slotting allowances play a 
screening role. Our model, however, assumes multiple manufacturers and 
concludes that product proliferation can shift the division of channel profits 
toward the retailer by raising the level of slotting allowances. Furthermore, 
the equilibrium of our open English auction represenation shows that the 
optimal screening property of slotting allowances does not necessarily rely 
on the retailer's knowledge of the distribution of the manufacturers' product 
profitability. 
III. Product Proliferation and R e n e d  Allowances 
We now consider competition for shelf space among manufacturers of es- 
tablished products. Although we reinterpret the variables to match the con- 
text of established products, this model has the same structure as the one 
described in Table 1 above. That is, a retailer has F facings available for 
estblished prodcuts; N manufacturers each produce an established product; 
and s, describes the renewal allowance of the ith manufacturer. 
Informational Assumptions, Auction Mechanism, and Equilibrium Concept 
The distinguishing feature that makes our second model applicable to es - 
tablished products is the assumption that the retailer has complete infor- 
mation about each individual manufacturer's product profitability. As a re- 
sult, different renewal allowance arrangements can be made with each 
manufacturer. To allow for this realistic possibility, we assume that each 
manufacturer i makes a renewal allowance offer and the retailer selects from 
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the  offer^.^' Because this is a perfect information model, the relevant equili- 
brium concept is a subgame perfection(consisting of properties 1 and 2 of the 
perfect Bayesian equilibrium described in Appendix 1) 
Equilibrium 
We can obtain the following equilibrium regarding renewal allowances. 
(For this equilibrium let n be the largest integer between 0 and F, inclusive, 
for which n,>nFtl+nFtl. ) 
Prropition 3. The top F products attain shelf placement in equilibrium. 
Manufacturers of the n most profitable products pay no renewal allowances. 
The next F-n  manufacturers pay renewal allowances in inverse relationship 
to profitability (in particular, manufacturer i=n+l,...,F pays renewal allow - 
ance of nFtl+nF+l-~i+&). 
The intuitve rationale is again that the top F manufacturers keep the 
other manufacturers' products off the shelves by providing the retailer with 
more profit than the F+lst  manufacturer could possibly provide. As in the 
slotting allowance model, the maximum renewal allowance that the F+lst 
manufacturer would be willing to pay is nF+,; however, in this model, the 
retailer knows that it also gets retail profit of n,, from the F+lst manufac- 
turer. Therefore, the opportunity cost of a shelf facing in this complete infor - 
mation context is nF+,+nFt1. To be assured of a slot, a manufacturer must 
thus provide a renewal allowance which when added to the associated retail 
profit n ,  is greater than or equal to n,,+n,,+e. 
The situation is depicted in Figure 2. The opportunity cost of a shelf 
8) The open English auction and the single retail take-it-or-leave-it offer mechanism suffer from the 
drawback that they automatically result in the same renewal allowance for all manufacturers(in 
fact, the outcome is easily shown to be Proposition 1, which we have already considered). Another 
possible allocational mechanism is for the retailer to make a different take-it-or-leave-it offer to 
each manufacturer, which leads to the unrealistic outcome that the retailer extracts all of the chan- 
nel profit. This mechanism ignores the fact that a profitable manufactuer may balk at such an offer 
by the retailer. Both the retailer and the profitable manufacturers control scarce resources (shelf 
space and profitable brands), and it appears inappropriate to apply an allocational mechanism that 
guarantees the retailer all of the surplus. 
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facing, nFtl+nF+l, determines the equilibrium renewal allowances paid by 
the top F manufacturers. Products i=l,.-,n, if carried by the retailer, 
already generate retail profit in excess of this opportunity cost. Hence, 
manufacturers of these products do not need to offer renewal allowances to 
be slotted. Manufacturers i = n+l,-,F, however, find themselves in a dif- 
ferent position. Their products generate retail profit, ni, less than the total 
profit nFtl+n,l+a required to keep the F+lst product off the the shelves. 
Such manufacturers must provide renewal allowance equal to the difference, 
nF+ l nF+ - ni+&, in order to be assured of shelf placement. 
Figure 2 
EQUILIBRIUM OF RENEWAL ALLOWANCE MODEL 
Pull Products Push Products 
II = Manufacturer Profit for Product i 
R = Direct Retail Profit from Product i 
= Renewal Allowances 
SEOUL JOURNAL OF BUSINESS 105 
This model provides a formalization of the difference between push and 
pull approaches to achieving retail placement. To make their products 
sufficiently attractive to the retailer, less profitable manufacturers make 
concessions in the form of large renewal allowances, a push approach. 
Manufacturers whose products enjoy the greatest consumer pull, on the 
other hand, find it unnecessary to pay large, or even any, renewal 
allowances. 
We now examine the effect of product proliferation on the determination 
of renewal allowances. 
Propition 4. Product proliferaton(inc1uding at least one product with total 
profit higher than nFt l+nF+ ) leads to an increase in renewal allowances. 
As with Proposition 2, if additional products become available with total 
profit higher than the previous F+lst product, then there will be a new 
~ + l s t  product such that n:E + n:: >nFtl+nF+,, and aU equilibrium re- 
newal allowances will increase to meet the new opportunity cost of shelf 
space. This again demonstrates how heightened competition for shelf space 
can drive manufacturers to make greater concessions to retailers, as has oc- 
curred in the consumer packaged goods industry. 
Product Lines 
For this model, we also show that a manufacturer with a profitable pro- 
duct line may have an advantage over a single-product manufacturer in 
achieving shelf placement for a less profitable item. Consider the manufac- 
turer of a product line consisting of a profitable product i and an unprofit- 
able product j. In particular, suppose that: 
(1 ) ni>nF+ l+nF  (i. e., product i is profitable) 
(2) n,+ni<nF+ l+nF+l (i.e., product j is unprofitable), and 
(3) n,+~+n,>nF+nF+nF+ ,+nF  l+~. (i.e., product i and j together give 
greater profit to the retailer than the two next best opportunities of the re- 
tailer) 
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In other words, product i is such that it would pay zero renewal allowance 
in the equilibrium of Propostion 3. Prdocut j is less profitbale than product 
F+1, which represents the next best opportunity. Products i and j are(sub- 
stantially) more profitable than products F and F+1. 
We assume that the manufacturer of i and j may make either separate or 
joint offers for placement of products i and j. If the manufacturer makes a 
joint offer that is rejected by the retailer, neither product is placed and 
renegotiation is not allowed. Our key assumption is that negative renewal 
allowances are prohibited. The rest of the set-up being exactly as for Prop- 
osition 3, we arrive at the following conclusion. 
Proposition 5. The manufacturer of the product line consisting of i and j 
achieves shelf placement for both products in equilibrium(even though pro- 
duct j would not have been placed if it had been manufactured by a 
single -product manufacturer ). 
The intuitive rationale for this result is that product i is sufficiently more 
profitable than the next best opportunity that the retailer is willing to carry 
a relatively unprofitable product, j, rather than lose product i. Of course 
antitrust restrictions on tie-in may limit the explicit exercise of such 
bargaining leverage to some degree. 
This result has important implications for entry barriers. Products in the 
earliest phase of the life-cycle are typically less profitable than products in 
later phases. A single-product manufacturer introducing a new product thus 
faces a barrier to shelf placement that a manufacturer with a product line 
can avoid. This advantage, together with synergies in new product develop- 
ment, manufacturing, and consumer brand acceptance, may account for why 
so many new products on grocer's shelves are made by existing companies. 
IV . Conclusion 
Our findings regarding shelf space allocation, product proliferation, the 
division of channel profits, and the role of slotting and renewal allowances 
are as follows. 
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For new products, manufacturers signal the potential profitability of 
their products by paying slotting allowances. 
Product proliferation leads to an increase in slotting allowances. 
For existing products, profitable manufacuters pay little or no renewal 
allowances(i.e., a pull approach to shelf placement ), while less profit - 
able manufacturers pay more renewal allowances(i.e., a push approach 
to shelf placement ). 
Product proliferation leads to an increase in renewal allowances. 
Manufacturers with a profitable product line may be more likely to ob- 
tain shelf placement for a less profitable product than a single-product 
manufacturer, if the manufacturer of the product line can tie its less 
profitable product in with its profitable product line. 
Some caveats regarding the application of our analysis to consumer 
packaged goods channels are in order. First, there are other important 
factors influencing channel power such as increased retailer access to scan- 
ner information, greater store size and retail concentration, and maturing of 
product markets (Messinger and Narasimhan, 1994). Second, we have 
assumed that the products are neither substitutes nor complements, and that 
there is only one retailer. It would be desirable to explore robustness when 
relaxing these assumptions. 
Overall, we believe that the issues of product proliferation, slotting 
allowances, renewal allowances, push versus pull strategies, and 
countervailing leverage of manufacturers with product lines are of sufficient 
moment to the grocery and other similarly-evolving retail sectors to merit 
further study. 
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Appendix 1 
Perfect Bayesian and Subgame Perfect Equilibrium 
We represent retailer acceptance of prodcut i by assigning to the choice 
function Cl(sl,...s,) the value of one and rejection of the ith offer by 
assigning to the choice function the value of zero. A perfect Bayesian equi- 
librium in the context of this model consists of a set of manufacturers' offers 
s*= (s*, ,s*,), a retailer choice function @= (C1, -.. ,CN), and retailer pos - 
terior beliefs X i= 1, ,N, that possess the following properties. 
1. Optimality of Manufacturers' Strategies. Each manufacturer i is made at 
least as well off by playing the equilibrium s; as by deviating to s:. That is, 
for all S:E [0, n l ] .  where s - ~  is the N-1  vector of slotting (or renewal) 
allowances of all manufacturers except the ith. 
2. Optimality of the Retailer's Strategy. The retailer accepts F offers that it 
expects to yield at least as much total retail profit plus slotting (or renewal) 
allowances as any other set of F offers. That is, the retailer is made at least 
as well off by playing C as by deviating to C:  
3. BayesConsistency of The posterior expected retail profit for 
any product i is equal to the average retail profit of the products of all 
manufacturers that offer s:. (The intuitive rationale is that, in equilibrium, 
the retailer's posterior beliefs are correct on average over the group of 
manufacturers that offer the same slotting allowance. ) 
Formally, suppose s:€ {sl,--,s? for all i = 1,--,N, where sl,--,sP are mutu- 
ally distinct. Then the posterior beliefs b: are Bayes-consistent if 
9) We present a formulation of Bayesian-consistent beliefs that is easy to work within the context of 
our model. A more common formulation, in terms of prior and posterior probability distributions 
(instead of prior and posterior expectations), includes the present formulation as a special case. 
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(A41 i: =x 9 / # AP when and only when si=sp, 
j€AP 
for p~ {I,.-,PI, where AP={i: s:=s4 and #AP denotes the cardinality of A'. 
In the context of the model of renewal allowances, a subgame perfect 
equilibrium consists of properties 1 and 2 in a full information setting. The 
defining property of a subgame perfect equilibrium is that the equilibrium 
strategies of the multistage game are also equilibrium strategies of each 
subgame. Therefore, one can establish that an equilibrium is subgame per- 
fect by working recursively backward from the last stage of the game, 
analyzing the equilibria of the successive subgames. 
For background on these equilibrium concepts see Fudenberg and Tirole 
(1991, pp. 325-326). 
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Appendix 2 
Condensed Proofs 
An extended version of this appendix can be obtained from the authors on 
request. 
Proposition 1 
English Auction (Proof). Equilibrium is reached when the top F 
manufacturers bid nF+l+~. The last of the other N-F manufacturers drop 
out of the bidding at that point. 
This outcome arises because each manufacturer i has an incentive to stay 
in the bidding until the slotting allowance level is ni and to drop out there- 
after. When the slotting allowance reaches n,,, the top F+1 manufacturers 
remain in the bidding. When the bidding reaches nF+,+&, the F+lst manu- 
facturer drops out and equilibrium is attained. Q.E.D. 
Sealed Bid Auction(Sketch of proof). We demonstrate below that the equi- 
librium consists of manufacturers i=l,.-..F offering nF+l+~ and the other 
manufacturers i=F+l,.-o,N offering n, The retailer's equilibrium belief 
structure is such that if the slotting allowance exceeds n,,, than the pos- 
1 terior expected profit, $,, equals - ni-the average of the top F products. F i=1 
Otherwise if ( n w l ,  nx], then ji:=n,, where k = F f l , . . . , N - ~ ' ~ '  The re- 
tailer chooses those products from which the sum of the slotting allowance 
and posterior expected retail profit, sit&, is highest (if there is a tie, the re- 
tailer choose randomly among the tied products). 
We sketch why there is no incentive for any player to deviate from these 
strategies. For one of the top F manufacturers, offering a slotting allowance 
lower than nF+ ,+E leads to losing the certainty of shelf placement(because the 
F+lst manufacturer is offering s,,=nF+,>. Offering more is not neces- 
sary since nF+,+& already signals that the product is among the F most profit- 
able. Any other manufacturer i~ {F+l,...JVl does not attain shelf place- 
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ment in equilibrium, and hence gets zero profit, any other feasible slotting 
allowance for such a manufacturer leads to the same outcome and does not 
make the manufacturer any better off. The retailer's strategy of choosing 
those products with the highest slotting allowance and expected retailer 
profit is clearly optimal, provided that the retailer's beliefs are accurate. 
Finally, it is easy to verify Bayes-consistency of the retailer's beliefs in this 
equilibriurn(in this case P =  N-Fi-1). In particular, the belief that, on ave- 
rage, those manufactures that offer slotting allowances of more than nF+, 
1 " have products which generate retail profits of - F i = 1  1 q is fulf'illed in equili- 
brium. Q.E.D. 
Retailer take-it-or-leave-it Offer (Proof). The retailer will set the highest 
slotting allowance that fills all the shelves, which is nF. Any higher amount 
would induce the Fth  player to decline the shelf space and will not fill all 
the shelves. 
Manufacturers i=l,-*OF, will accept the slotting allowance offer of n, since 
the alternative is zero profits by not obtaining shelf space. Manufacturers 
i = F +I,.-. ,N will decline the slotting allowance, since acceptance entails 
negative net profit. Q.E.D. 
Note that even if we allow the retailer to intentionally leave shelves 
empty, it will choose to fill all the shelves if 
for all integers K <  F : 
that is, if the additional total profits generated by adding the K+ht product 
to the shelves exceeds the implied reduction in slotting allowances obtain- 
able form the first K prodcuts (this assumes that if the first K products are 
carried, the slotting allowance is nK). This condition will hold if n, does not 
drop rapidly as i is increased or if ni is large relative to 
Proposition 2 (Proof) 
(For the English and sealed-bid auctions) Product proliferation involving 
introduction of at least one new product with manufacturer profit greater 
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than nFtl will entail a reordering of products such that there is a new F+lst 
product and n: >nF+,. Therefore, according to Proposition 1, the slotting 
allowance will increase to n:+"1 +E. 
The proof of the retailer take-it-or-leave-it case is essentially the same 
and is omitted. Q.E.D. 
Proposition 3 (Sketch of proof) 
Let n~ {O,**.,F) be such that n.>nFt ,+rFt1 and n.+19nF+i+nFt l.ll' Then an 
equilibrium consists of the top n manufacturers offering zero renewal 
allowances ; manufacturers i = n + I,.- , F  offering nF+ l nF+ - ni+& ; and the 
remaining manufacterers i= F+I,--. ,N offering n, the retailer choose those 
manufacturers that offer the highest renewal allowances plus retail profit (if 
there is tie, the retailer chooses randomly among the tied products.) The 
outcome of this equilibrium is that the top F products are placed. 
We sketch why there is no incentive for any player to deviate from these 
strategies. The top n manufacturers attain shelf placement without paying 
renewal allowances. For manufacturers i = n+l,..-,F, offering less than nF+, 
+nF+, - ni+& leads to losing the certainty of shelf placement ; in particular, 
offering n,,+nFt, -ni gives the retailer renewal allowance plus retail profit 
of nF+l+nF+l, just equal to what the F+Zst manufacturer provides. These 
manufacturers also have no reason to offer more than nF+ nF+ - ni +E be- 
cause this arnout is sufficient to guarantee shelf placement. Manufacturers i 
= F+I,--- ,N do not attain shelf placement in equilibrium, and hence get zero 
profits: any other feasible renewal allowance offers lead to the same out- 
come and do not make these manufacturers any better off. In this full infor- 
mation context, the retailer's strategy is clearly optimal. Q.E.D. 
Proposition 4 (Proof) 
Product proliferation involving introduction of at least one new product 
with total manufacturer and retailer profit greater than nF+,+nF+ , will entail 
a new F+lst product in the ordering of products, and 
11) We define xo to be larger than n ~ +  ~ RF+ 1. 
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Therefore, according to Proposition 3, any firm i previously paying renewal 
allowances of nF+ l nF+ - n , + ~  will now pay increased renewal allowances of 
nA'iet( +n;y; 
F- 1 - z,+E. 
Proposition 5 (Brief sketch of proof) 
Given the equilibrium strategies of the players (which are analogous to 
those of Proposition 3) it turns out that if the retailer accepts the joint offer 
of the manufacturer of products i and j, the retailer will carry products (1,2, 
-,F -1, j), while if it rejects the manufacturer's offer, it wil carry (1,2,..-,F, 
F + -  The manufacturer that produces i and j will bundle the two 
products and offer a combined renewal allowance that will give the retailer 
at least E more than products F and F+I could maximally provide in re-  
newal allowances plus retail profit : nF+nF+nFt l+n, ,. The equilibrium re - 
newal allowance of the manufacturer of products i and j is accordingly n F + n  
F+n, nh - n, - n,+~. 12' Except for this feature the proof of equilibrium 
proceeds in the same way as for Proposition 3. 
12) This assumes that ~ i + ~ j  < ~ F + T F + ~ F + ~ + T F + ~ .  Otherwise the manufacturer of products i and j 
will pay zero renewal allowance in equilibrium and attain shelf placement. 
